Formation of SEZ, Agricultural Productivity and Urban Unemployment by Chaudhuri, Sarbajit & Yabuuchi, Shigemi
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Formation of SEZ, Agricultural
Productivity and Urban Unemployment
Sarbajit Chaudhuri and Shigemi Yabuuchi
University of Calcutta
11. October 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5324/
MPRA Paper No. 5324, posted 16. October 2007
  
 
1 
1 
Formation of SEZ, Agricultural Productivity and Urban Unemployment 
 
 
 
Sarbajit  Chaudhuria and Shigemi Yabuuchib,* 
 
 
Abstract: Formation of SEZ using agricultural land to promote industrialization has recently 
been one of most controversial policy issues in many developing economies including India.  
This paper critically theoretically evaluates the consequences of this policy in terms of a 
three-sector Harris-Todaro type general equilibrium model reasonable for a developing 
economy. It finds that agriculture and SEZ can grow simultaneously provided the 
government spends more than a critical amount on irrigation projects and other infrastructural 
development designed for improving the efficiency of land. Agricultural wage and aggregate 
employment in the economy may also improve.   
 
JEL classifications: R13, R14, H54 
 
Keywords: Special economic zone; fiscal concessions; agricultural productivity; rural 
wage; urban unemployment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a Dept. of Economics, University of Calcutta, 56A, B.T. Road, Kolkata 700 050, India. E-mail: 
sceco@caluniv.ac.in , sarbajitch@yahoo.com  
b  Dept. of Economics, Nagoya City University, Yamanohata, Mizuho, Nagoya 467-8501, Japan. 
Email: yabuuchi@econ.nagoya-cu.ac.jp. 
* Corresponding author. 
  
 
2 
2 
Formation of SEZ, Agricultural Productivity and Urban Unemployment 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are specifically defined duty free enclaves and are 
considered to be foreign territory for the purposes of trade operations and duties and tariffs. 
Formation of SEZs is an important constituent of the new industrial and export policies of 
India during the liberalized regime. The overwhelming success of China achieved through 
formation of several SEZs1 has attracted the attention of the policymakers in the developing 
countries2 like India. The Union government policy on SEZ in India, came into effect in 
April 2000. It is the latest thinking so far on India’s export policy and may even represent the 
future of industrial development strategy. SEZs need to be seen in the context of attempts by 
the Government of India, to launch second-generation reforms and also a continuation of 
earlier initiatives to boost exports. Export Processing Zone, Export Oriented Units, Free 
Trade Zones etc. SEZs allow the government to experiment with radical (in the Indian 
context) economic reform in a sufficiently large geographical area (minimum size 5,000 
hectares) but on a localized basis, without the difficulty of introducing such reforms at the 
national level. This may be viewed as an ambitious government plan to revitalize industry in 
its quest for 10 per cent annual economic growth. 
 
It is argued that well-implemented and designed SEZ can bring about many desired benefits 
for a host-country: increases in employment, FDI attraction, general economic growth, 
foreign exchange earnings, international exposure, and the transfer of new technologies and 
skills. In just a year, the government of India approved nearly 400 SEZs, and received 
 
1 See Li et al. (2005) for a detailed description of the role of SEZs in China’s overall economic 
development. 
2 According to World Bank estimates, as of 2007 there are more than 3,000 projects taking place in 
SEZs in 120 countries worldwide. 
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proposals from state governments for 304 more. But the plans of the government came to a 
grinding halt after thousands of farmers across the country protested against the government's 
compulsory land acquisition at some sites, claiming they had not been adequately 
compensated. There are controversies regarding the role played by the state governments in 
snatching of arable land or buying land at much discounted rates from farmers or poor people 
and then selling it to corporate houses at exorbitant prices. The protesters insisted that the 
policy would not be able to create the number of jobs as suggested by the government. 
Besides, it is also argued that this procedure of industrialization would affect agriculture 
seriously given the land size of the economy. Such a dilemma has been observed in many 
predominantly agricultural countries that intend to industrialize using agricultural land.3  
 
This has led to serious policy debate among economists and policymakers as to whether the 
SEZ policy is at all beneficial for the country. The major concerns are as follows: (i) Can 
industry (SEZs) and agriculture grow simultaneously without hurting one another (ii) Would 
this policy affect the unemployment situation adversely? (iii) How would the economic 
condition of the workers in the rural sector be affected due to this policy? As the experiment 
with this policy has just set off, it would be premature to find empirical answers to these 
queries. However, it is possible to predict the consequences of the SEZ policy by building up 
theoretical models based on the salient characteristics of a developing economy like India.  
 
The present paper purports to provide answers to the above questions in terms of a three-
sector Harris-Todaro (HT hereafter) type general equilibrium model with an SEZ located in 
the rural sector. The analysis of the paper finds that agriculture and SEZ can grow 
simultaneously under certain conditions. However, in the absence of any government 
spending on irrigation projects and other infrastructural development designed for improving 
the efficiency of land, formation of the SEZ affects agriculture adversely. It is also found that 
if agriculture receives government assistance greater than a critical level both agricultural 
 
3 See for example, Sarma (2007), Reddy and Reddy (2007), Bhaduri (2007) and Fernandes (2007) in 
this context.  
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wage and aggregate employment in the economy may improve. Thus, a certain balance has to 
be maintained between agriculture and industry so as to reap the full benefits of the SEZ 
policy.  
2. The model and assumptions 
 
Let us consider a small open economy in which there are three sectors.  One sector is an 
agricultural sector and produces good 1, 1X . The second sector is an industry in the SEZ 
located in the rural sector that produces an industrial good, 2X .  The third sector is the urban 
manufacturing sector and produces good 3, 2X . It is supposed that sector 1 uses labor and 
land, sector 2 uses labor, land and capital, and sector 3 uses labor and capital.  
The notations and the equations of the GE model are as follows; 
W = rural sector wage; 
R = return to land in physical unit (say, per acre); 
h =  productivity of land; 
R = return to land in efficiency unit; 
hR = return to land in physical unit; 
r = return to capital; 
*W = unionized urban wage of labour; 
S = total subsidy or govt. expenditure; 
Sα =  subsidy given to SEZ with ; 
(1 )Sα− = Govt. expenditure for improving productivity of land; 
 s = rate of price subsidy given to encourage formation of SEZ; 
N = given endowment of land in physical unit; 
(.)h N = land endowment in efficiency unit. 
 
Under perfect competition, we have 
1 1 1L NWa Ra+ =        (1) 
2 2 2 2(.) (1 )L N KWa h Ra ra P s+ + = +      (2) 
3 3 3* L KW a ra P+ =        (3) 
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where ija  is the amount of the ith factor used in the jth industry to produce one unit of the 
output and jp  is the price of the jth good (j = 1,2,3). Note that s is the rate of price subsidy 
given to encourage formation of the SEZ.   
2 2S sP Xβ =  i.e. 2 2( / )S P X sβ = . 
We will assume that subsidy is given to both the agricultural sector and the SEZ. A part of 
the subsidy is gone to agriculture for improving the efficiency of land. This assumption is 
justified on the ground that the government in a developing economy spends a substantial 
amount on major irrigation projects, construction of roads and for building up social 
infrastructure that raises the productivity of land. Simultaneously, in line with its new 
industrial policy sizeable amount of fiscal concessions are given on several occasions for 
encouraging formation of the SEZ.  If S be the aggregate government expenditure or subsidy, 
the fraction β of it is given to the SEZ while the remaining (1 )β− fraction is spent for 
improvement of agriculture. It is supposed that land efficiency, ,h  is improved by the 
government spending on irrigation projects etc. Thus, we write 
 ((1 ) );h h S h hβ= − = for (1 ) 0Sβ− =  i.e. 1;β = and, 0h′ >  for (1 ) 0Sβ− > . 
When the government spends nothing for agricultural development i.e. when 1β = , 
h h= (given exogenously). However, if the government’s expenditure on agriculture is 
positive i.e. if 1, 0hβ ′< > ; and, .h h>   
 
We assume that all goods are tradable and then their prices are internationally given. It is also 
assumed for the sake of analytical simplicity that 2Na is technologically given. Note that hR is 
the return to land in physical unit. 
  In this model, it is assumed that the wage rate in urban (manufacturing) sector 3 
( *W ) is set at a relatively high level, and it is rigid due to some political and/or institutional 
considerations, while the wage rate in rural (agricultural and SEZ)4 sectors (W) is flexible.  In 
this situation, the rural workers have two alternatives of staying in rural areas in order to 
obtain a job at a low wage rate or migrating to urban area in order to seek a high wage 
income at the risk of unemployment.  Thus, the labor allocation mechanism between the 
sectors is shown as follows: 
 
4 In fact one of the incentives for formation of SEZ in the rural areas is the ready availability of labour 
at low wage rates. 
  
 
6 
6 
   )/(* 3333 ULL LXaXaWW +=  ,     (4) 
 
where  33 XaL  and UL  are the employed and unemployed labor in the urban sector, 
respectively.  In the labor market equilibrium, therefore, the wage rate in the rural sectors (W) 
equals the expected wage income in sector 3, which equals the manufacturing wage rate 
( *W ) times the probability of finding a job in the urban manufacturing sector 
( )/( 3333 ULL LXaXa + ).  
 Exogenously given endowments impose the following resource constraints: 
 
 2 2 3 3K Ka X a X K+ =       (5) 
 1 1 2 2N Na X ha X hN+ =       (6) 
 1 1 2 2 3 3L L L Ua X a X a X L L+ + + =      (7) 
       
where K and L are the endowments of labor and capital, respectively, while N  is given 
endowment of land in physical unit and Nh  is land endowment in efficiency unit.  We obtain 
from (4) and (7)  
 
 3 3 2 2 3 3( * / ) L L LW W a X a X a X L+ + = .    (8) 
 
This completes the specification of our model with the fixed endowment of factors and the 
internationally determined prices.  We have six unknown variables, W , R, r, 21, XX , and 
3X , which are solved by six equations (1)–(3), (5), (6) and (8) for given parameters, *W , 
2 3,P P ,L, K,N, β  and S.  
 
3. Subsidy and production 
 
Now let us examine the effects of subsidy on the change in outputs. Differentiating equations 
(1) – (3), (5), (6) and (8), we obtain 
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1 1
2 2
2 3 1
1 2 2
1 2 3
3
ˆ0 0 0 0
ˆ0 0
ˆˆ0 0 0
0 ˆ
0ˆ
L N
L N
K K
N N
L L L
W
Rs A
B SX
C D EX
F G X
θ θ
θ θ
λ λ
λ λ
λ λ λ
                =                 
    (9) 
 
where /(1 )s s s= + , 3 3( * / )L LW Wλ λ= , 2N hA s θ ε= − , 22 0K KLB Sλ= > , 11 0N NLC Sλ= > ,  
1
1 0N NND Sλ= < ,  1 0N hE λ ε= ≥ , 1 21 2 3( ) 0L LL L LL LF S Sλ λ λ= + − < ,  11 0L LNG Sλ= > . 
 
The value of the determinants of the coefficient matrix of the system (9) is 
 
3 1 2 3 3 1 1 1
1 3 1 1 3 1
{ } ( )
{ ( ) )}]
K N K L K N L N
N K N L L N
s D C
F G B
θ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ θ θ
λ λ θ θ λ θ
∆ = − − + −
+ − + ,   (10) 
where 
 
 1 2 2 1L N L Nθ θ θ θ θ= −    and    1 2 2 1L N L Nλ λ λ λ λ= −  
 
It can be seen that 0∆ <  if sector 1 is labour-intensive than sector 2 with respect to land5, i.e.  
0θ >  and  0λ > . 
 
[A] The change in output 2 
 We are interested in the changes in outputs of three sectors. First, consider the effect 
of the subsidy on the output of the SEZ.  
We obtain from (9) 
 
2 1 3 1 3 1 1
1 3 1 1 1 3 1
ˆˆ( / ) /[ { ( )
( ) }] /
L K L K L N
N K N L N L N
X S E A D C
F G B
λ λ θ λ λ θ θ
λ λ θ θ λ λ θ
− + −
+ − − ∆ .   (11) 
 
 
5 It may be noted that the SEZ use both labour and land in lesser quantities than agriculture. Despite 
this, the SEZ can use anyone of those two factors more intensively with respect to the other than the 
other sector. 
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This leads to the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: The subsidy increases the output of the SEZ if 0A ≥ .  
 
 The subsidy increases land in efficiency term. This increases the output of sector 2 
through the Rybczynski effect under the assumption that sector 2 is land-intensive with respect 
to labour. The first term of (12) captures this effect. Note that this effect vanishes if 0β =  
(i.e. E=0) and no subsidy is allocated to improve land efficiency. 
 The terms in the curly brackets capture the usual resource-reallocation effect 
(Rybczynski-type effect) following the Stolper-Samuelson effect which arises due to the 
subsidy given to sector 2 (SEZ). That is, the subsidy increases the producer’s price, and then 
it expands the production of sector 2.  The larger the share of subsidy given to SEZ (i.e. the 
larger the value of A), the larger would be the increase in the output.  
 
 
[B] The change in output 1 
 Now, let us turn to examine the effect on output 1. Solving (9) for 1Xˆ with respect to 
Sˆ , we obtain 
 
  1 1 1 2
1 3 3 1 3
ˆˆ( / ) [ { ( )} ( )
{ ( ) ] /
N L N
N L K L K
X S E A C D A sE
B F G
θ θ θ λ
θ λ λ θ λ
= −Λ + − + − ×
− + ∆  , (12) 
 
where 2 3 3 2K L K Lλ λ λ λΛ = − . Thus, the following proposition is immediate. 
 
Proposition 2: The subsidy increases the output of sector 1 if (i) 2 /Ns A Eλ≥ ,  (ii) 0A ≥  
and (iii) sector 2 is capital-intensive vis-à-vis sector 3 with respect to labour, i.e. 0Λ > . 
 
 As discussed previously, the subsidy given to agriculture raises the efficiency of land 
and hence the land endowment of the economy in efficiency unit. This increases the output of 
sector 2 through the Rybczynski effect if this sector is land-intensive than sector 1. This in 
turn demands capital and labour from sector 3. Consequently sector 3 contracts leading to 
reverse migration of labour from the urban to the rural sector. A large amount of labour is 
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released from sector 3 because sector 3 is labour-intensive than sector 2 with respect to 
capital. Sector 2 cannot absorb all the workers who have migrated back to the rural sector. 
This causes the output of sector 1 to expand since sector 1 is labour-intensive relative to 
sector 2. However, this is possible if sector 1 gets a sizeable amount of the subsidy and the 
land efficiency is sufficiently increased which is guaranteed by the condition: 2 /Ns A Eλ≥ .  
In the extreme case where the agricultural sector does not get any subsidy, 0E = ;and, from 
(12) it follows that the subsidy policy designed to encourage formation of the SEZ leads to an 
unambiguous contraction of the agricultural sector. 
 The subsidy given to SEZ also expands the production of sector 2. This effect 
enforces the movement of resources, and it raises the output of sector 1 under the conditions 
as stated in the proposition. 
 
[C] The change in output 3 
 Finally, we consider the change in output in sector 3. From (9) we obtain the 
following expression. 
 
3 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1
2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
ˆˆ( / ) [ ( ) {
( ) ( )}] /
L K L N N N L N
K N L N K L L N
X S E B sE A A B
C F A D G
λ λ θ λ θ λ λ λ θ
λ θ λ λ λ θ λ λ
= + − +
+ − − − ∆ . (13) 
 
The result is summarized as follows. 
 
Proposition 3: The subsidy decreases the output of sector 3 if (i) 2 /Ns A Eλ≥  and 
(ii) 0A ≥ .  
 
 Note that the output of sector 1 increases if (i) 2 /Ns A Eλ≥ , (ii) 0A ≥  and (iii) sector 
2 is capital intensive than sector 3 with respect to labour (i.e. 0Λ > ), while that of sector 2 
increases if 0A ≥ . Thus, both outputs increase under the condition stated in Proposition 3.  
This implies that the expansion of sector 2 absorbs capital from sector 3. Labour is also 
reallocated from sector 3 to both sectors 1 and 2. This induces the contraction of sector 3. 
 Thus the conditions (i) 2 /Ns A Eλ≥  and (ii) 0A ≥  play very crucial role in 
determining the effects of the subsidy policy on the production structure. Let us examine the 
  
 
10 
10 
relation between the two conditions. Considering the definitions of ,s A and E , and arranging 
terms we obtain that 
2
2 1( )
N
N N h
M M
H S HS
λ βλ λ ε ≥ ≥−       (13) 
 
where 2 2 2N hM P Xθ ε=  and 2(1 ) 0N hH θ ε= − > .6  Note that β  is the fraction of the subsidy 
allocated to SEZ. Thus, two conditions are summarized in the condition that the ratio is 
between the two values as shown in (13). This implies that the value of β constitutes an 
important part of the sufficient conditions for outputs of sectors 1 and 2 to increase while that 
of sector 3 to decrease. 
 
4. Subsidy, wage rate and unemployment 
 
The effects of the subsidy on the wage rate and unemployment are also extremely important 
in a developing economy like India where chronic unemployment and poor economic 
conditions of the informal sector workers are two of the major disconcerting problems. We 
will investigate how these two are affected by the subsidy policy and examine the relation 
between the production structure and the labour market.  
 
[A] The change in the wage rate 
 From (9) we obtain the effect of the subsidy on the wage rate as 
 
  1 1 1 3 2ˆˆ( / ) [ ( )] /N N N K NW S A A sEθ λ λ λ λ= Λ + − ∆ ,   (14) 
 
where 2 3 3 2K L K Lλ λ λ λΛ = − . The result is summarized in terms of the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4: The subsidy increases the wage rate  if (i) 2 /Ns A Eλ≥ ;  (ii) 0A ≥ ; and, if 
(iii) 3 0Lλ ≅ . 
 
 
6 See the appendix for the detailed derivation. 
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 The subsidy leads to expansion of sectors 1 and 2 under the conditions (i) and (ii) as 
stated above. The displaced workers from the urban sector flock to agriculture while the latter 
raises its demand for labour as it expands which is permissible by the increase in the effective 
land endowment of the economy. So two opposite effects work on the rural sector 
competitive wage,W . The possibility forW to increase rises with a decrease in the number of 
workers released by sector 3. If the allocative share of labour in sector 3 is sufficiently small, 
i.e. 3 0Lλ ≅  and the other two sufficient conditions hold, the competitive wage rate rises 
owing to the subsidy policy. From (14) it is also evident that W rises even if sector 2 is 
labour-intensive7 relative to sector 3. However, in this case the possibility for the agricultural 
sector to contract is also higher. 
 
[B] The change in unemployment 
 Finally, let us examine the effect of the subsidy on unemployment. Differentiating (4) 
and using (13) and (14), we obtain  
 
1 2 2 1 1 1
1 1 2 3 3
2 1 1 1 1 1 2 3
ˆˆ( / ) [ ( )
( )( / )
( ) { ( / ) ] /
U LU L K K L L N
L N N L K LU
K N L N N N L L LU
L S E A D G
sE A B
A C F A B
λ λ λ θ λ θ λ λ
λ θ λ λ λ λ
λ θ λ λ λ θ λ λ λ
= − −
+ − +
+ − + − Λ ∆
, 
         (15) 
where /LU UL Lλ = . From (15) the following proposition readily follows. 
 
Proposition 5: The subsidy decreases unemployment if (i) 2 /Ns A Eλ≥ ,  (ii) 0A ≥  and 
(iii) 3 0Lλ ≅ . 
 
 In the HT framework the consequence of any policy on urban unemployment 
crucially hinges on the relative strengths of the centrifugal and centripetal forces. Conditions 
(i) and (ii) as stated in proposition 5 are sufficient for the expansion of sectors 1 and 2 and 
contraction of sector 3 following the subsidy policy. Labour and capital move from sector 3 
 
7 That sector 2 is labour-intensive vis-à-vis sector 3 with respect to capital in the value sense (i.e. 
0Λ < ) implies that sector 2 is labour intensive than sector 3 also in the physical sense, (i.e. 0Λ < ) 
where 2 3 3 2( ) 0K L K Lλ λ λ λΛ = − < ; and, 2 3 3 2( ) 0.K L K Lλ λ λ λΛ = − <  
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to the two rural sectors. As sector 3 contracts both in terms of output and employment the 
expected urban wage decreases for each worker thereby leading to a reverse migration from 
the urban to the rural sectors. Therefore the strength of the centrifugal force that draws rural 
workers into the urban sector weakens. On the other hand, the availability of more workers in 
the rural sectors exerts a downward pressure on the rural wage, W . On the contrary, there 
will also be a positive effect on W as both the rural sectors expand. The second effect 
outweighs the first negative effect either if the allocative share of labour in sector 3 is 
significantly low (i.e. 3 0Lλ ≅ ) or if sector 3 is capital-intensive. Thus the strength of the 
centripetal force that keeps the workers in the rural sector increases asW rises. Thus we find 
that if the sufficient condition (iii) is satisfied both the centrifugal and centripetal forces work 
in the same direction and the additional workers in the rural workers are supplied from the 
pool of unemployed workers. Consequently, the level of urban unemployment falls. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
Provision of agricultural land and fiscal concessions for setting up of SEZ have been 
considered to be the new industrial policy in the labour-abundant and predominantly 
agricultural economies like India. The advocates of the SEZ policy believe that this will usher 
in an industrial revolution and lead to an overall economic development of the country. 
Although the process was initiated with much enthusiasm it came to a standstill due to 
protests by the opposition parties, farmers and certain academicians including economists. 
The opponents believe that the costs of maintaining SEZ privileges are not offset by benefits 
to the rest of the economy. It is easily understandable that given the land size of the economy, 
the formation of SEZs using agricultural land is bound to hurt agriculture and the people 
dependent on it. An attempt has been made in this paper to theoretically challenge this 
common wisdom using a three-sector Harris-Todaro type model. The paper finds that it is 
possible for both the agricultural sector and the SEZ to grow simultaneously if the subsidy 
policy of the government is designed in an appropriate way. A part of the subsidy must be 
spent on irrigation projects and other infrastructural development that raise the productivity 
of land and hence the effective land endowment of the economy. The fraction of the 
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aggregate subsidy allocated to the SEZ must lie between two critical values which in turn 
depend on the institutional, technological and trade-related factors of the economy. The 
unemployment problem and the economic conditions of the common people may also 
improve in the process. The final outcomes, of course, rely much on the political will of the 
government.  
 
 
Appendix 
 
Here we derive (13) in the main text. By definitions of s , A and E,  2 /Ns A Eλ≥  can be 
written as 
 
  2 2 1/(1 ) { /(1 ) }/N N h N hs s s sλ θ ε λ ε+ ≥ + −     (A1) 
or 
  2 1 2 2
1 1(1 )
N N h N N
N h N
s
s
λ λ ε λ θ
λ ε λ
   − ≤  +  
.      (A2) 
 
Considering 2 2/s S P Xβ= , we obtain the LHS of equation (13) that 
 
  2 2 2 2
2 1 2 2
[ ]
( )
N N h
N N h N N h
P X
S
λ θ ε βλ λ ε λ θ ε ≥− −       (A3) 
 
From (A3) it follows that 
 
2 1( ) 0;N N hλ λ ε− >  and 2(1 ) 0.N hθ ε− >                                               (A4) 
 
(A3) is rewritten as follows. 
2
2 1( )
N
N N h
M
H S
λ βλ λ ε ≥−        (A5) 
 
where 2 2 2N hM P Xθ ε=  and 2(1 ) 0N hH θ ε= − > . 
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 Now it can be seen that 0A ≥  implies 
 
   2 2(1 )N h N hs θ ε θ ε≥ − .       (A6) 
 
Considering 2 2/s S P Xβ=  again, (A6) may be written as 
 
   2
2 2 2(1 )
N h
N h
S
P X
θ εβ
θ ε≥ −        (A7) 
 
or equivalently, 
  
   2 2 2
2(1 )
N h
N h
P X MS
H
θ εβ θ ε≥ =− .      (A8) 
 
Thus, from (A5) and (A8), we obtain equation (13) in the text. 
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